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1 Introduction
The extended period of low interest rates on safe assets in advanced economies since the financial
crisis of 2007-2009 and the downward trend observed even before then suggests that the so called
natural rate of interest, i.e. the interest rate consistent with a closed output gap and stable infla-
tion, might have declined. According to the widely discussed estimates by Laubach and Williams
(2016), the natural rate in the United States displays a downward trend since the 1980s, interrupted
briefly during the 1990s. Some observers have labeled this phenomenon “Secular Stagnation” (e.g.
Summers (2014), Eggertsson et al. (2018)). Laubach and Williams (2016) filter their natural rate es-
timate using a small semistructural macroeconomic model featuring inter alia an aggregate demand
equation (supposed to proxy a consumption Euler equation) and a Phillips Curve. They decompose
the natural rate into a component driven by trend GDP growth and an unexplained residual (the
so-called “z component”). As can be obtained from Figure 3 below, their estimate attributes most of
the estimated decline in the natural rate to this residual, which represents essentially an exogenous
decline in aggregate demand. The large role of the “z component” has been confirmed by recent
extensions of the Laubach and Williams model (e.g. Brand and Mazelis (2019), Krustev (2018)).
Similarly, using estimated DSGE models of the US economy, Gerali and Neri (2017) and Del Negro
et al. (2017) attribute a large role to shocks which directly increase the demand of households for
safe assets at the expense of consumption and investment. What is more, Rachel and Summers
(2019) argue that the the results of Laubach and Williams (2016) mask an even more dramatic
decline in the “private sector” natural rate of about 7% across advanced economies since the 1970s,
which was partially offset by the expansionary effects of the simultaneous increase in government
debt, as well as the obligations implied by the presence of pay-as-you go pensions systems and
government funded healthcare.
I investigate to which extend changes in the distribution of income can contribute to explaining
the downward trend in the US natural rate since the 1980s. Such a role is suggested by Summers
(2014) and Rachel and Smith (2017), who observe that the downward trend in real rates coincides
with an increase in inequality. For instance, according to the World Inequality Database (WID)
developed by Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and their collaborators, the income share of the
bottom 90% of US households declined by about 12% from 1980 to 2007 (see Figure 3 below,
Alvaredo et al. (2016) and Piketty et al. (2018)). In principle, a secular increase in inequality
could depress the natural rate of interest if the marginal propensity to save out of permanent
income changes is higher for richer households, as found by Dynan et al. (2004). I formalize this
mechanism in a model with two distinct groups of households, one of which represents the top 10%
of the income distribution (referred to as “the rich”), and the other the remainder. Crucially, the rich
derive utility from the level of their wealth, a motive first suggested by Max Weber (1958). Such
“Capitalist Spirit” type preferences (CSP) have been found useful to replicate a range of puzzling
phenomena, including the aforementioned higher marginal propensity to save of rich households
(Kumhof et al. 2015), the magnitude of the wealth-to-income ratio of rich households (e. g. Carrol
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(2000), Francis (2009) and Piketty (2011)) and stock market volatility (Bakshi and Chen 1996).
I assume that the two types of households supply distinct types of labor to firms and that only
the rich earn the profits of monopolistically competitive firms. Income inequality in the economy
may thus increase to due an exogenous increase in the relative demand for rich household labor or
decrease in product market competition.
I first show that in an economy where the bottom 90% are hand-to-mouth consumers and the
only asset available to the rich are government bonds, the natural rate declines strongly in response
to a decline in the bottom 90% income share in the presence of CSP, regardless of whether the
decline is caused by an increase in the price markup or an increase in the relative demand for rich
household labor. The non-rich lower their consumption by the amount of their income decline,
while at the initial interest rate, the rich attempt to save part of the increase in their permanent
income. Thus the interest rate needs to decline to equilibrate the government bond market and
thus reduce equilibrium saving of the rich to zero.
I then extend the assets available to the rich in the model by allowing for home ownership by
both income groups and a housing market, a credit market subject to frictions where the non-rich
borrow from the rich via financial intermediaries using their home as collateral, and physical capital
as an additional factor of production owned by the rich. In this setup, in the presence of CSP a
given increase in inequality continues to lower the natural rate, though by less than in the simple
model. The main reason for the smaller decline in the natural rate is that the non-rich postpone the
decline in their consumption of goods and housing services by increasing their borrowing in response
to the lower interest rate they face. Therefore the house price increases as well, which contributes
to relaxing the borrowing constrained faced by the non-rich. By contrast, without CSP, an increase
in inequality does not lower the natural rate and causes a decline in household borrowing.
I then replicate the decline in bottom 90% income share observed over the 1981-2014 period and
the post 2001 decline in the labor share (i.e. the increase in functional income inequality) within the
model. As can be obtained from Figure 3, the simulated increase in inequality generates a decline
in the natural interest rate by between 3 and 4 percentage points, in line with the component
the natural rate decline Laubach and Williams (2016) attribute to factors other than trend GDP
growth (labeled “z_LW” in the graph). At the same time, the simulation broadly captures the
upward trend in the debt-to-income ratio and LTV of the bottom 90% of households observed over
the 1981-2007 period, as well as the simultaneous upward trend of the value of the housing stock.
The simulation thus suggests that the decline in the natural rate of interest and the pre-crisis upward
trend in in household indebtedness and house prices are to a significant extent both consequences
of a more skewed income distribution. Put differently, the increase in income inequality meant that
the Federal Reserve had to accept a downward trend of the Federal Funds rate and the associated
rise in household debt and house prices if it wanted to continue to meet its inflation target. The
simulation thus formalizes the scenario sketched in Summers (2014).
The focus of my contribution are US developments, while, as mentioned above, the downward
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trend in safe real interest rates is a phenomenon observed across advanced economies. There
appears to be a global upward trend in within country inequality as measured by the top 10%
income share too, but speeds differ across countries (see Alvaredo et al. 2018), with a substantially
larger increase observed in the US and UK than in continental Europe. My result that a given
decline in the bottom 90% income share causes a larger decline in the natural rate in the simple
model where non-rich households cannot borrow than in the model with borrowing by the non-rich
may suggest that in economies with tighter regulations of household borrowing like Germany or
Italy, a smaller increase in inequality might suffice to trigger a given decline in the natural rate.
However, I leave an investigation of the causes of the decline of the natural rate outside the US to
future research.
There is an evolving literature modeling a link between the increase in inequality and the decline
of the natural rate. Most of these contributions assume the incomes gains (losses) experienced by
the rich (non-rich) to be transitory in some sense. For instance, Eggertsson and Merothra (2018)
show that an increase in inequality within the middle generation of a three generation OLG model
with credit constraints may reduce the natural rate if both the young and poor middle aged are
credit constrained, which requires that the poor middle aged expect their income to increase upon
retirement. By contrast, Eggertsson et al. (2018) emphasize that an increase in inequality persisting
across all ages does not change the natural rate in their model. Lancastre (2016) extends this
approach by adding a bequest motive where agents care about the sum of the bequest and their
children’s middle age income, and that parent’s and children’s “middle age” income is negatively
correlated, which appears at odds with the evidence (e.g. Charles and Hurst (2003), Lee and
Solon (2009), Bjoerklund and Jaentti (2012)). He finds that replicating the increase of the top
10% income share over the 1985-2015 period reduces the interest rate by one percentage point
and expands the borrowing of the young generation by about 16%. By contrast, the US mortgage
debt-to-GDP ratio increased by about 63% over the same period, corresponding to 20% of GDP.
In the heterogenous agent models of Auclert and Rognlie (2018) and Rachel and Summers (2019),
an increase in inequality driven by higher income uncertainty increases precautionary saving and
thus lowers the natural interest rate. By contrast, Auclert and Rognlie (2018) find that higher
inequality resulting from permanently enriching some households at the expense of others has only
marginal effects on the natural rate. However, Kopczuck et al. (2010) and De Baecker et al. (2013)
provide evidence that increases in permanent (not transitory) earnings variance drove the increase
in inequality observed in recent decades in the US. Furthermore, Kopczuck et al. (2010) report
that short and long term income mobility has been either stable or declining since the 1950s. Both
Auclert and Rognlie (2018) and Rachel and Summers (2019) find that rising inequality reduced
the natural rate by about 0.8 percentage points. An exception is Straub (2017), who considers
permanent labor income changes in a heterogenous agent 65 generation OLG model where all agents
have non-homothetic preferences over bequests, which generates a positive relationship between
permanent income and saving. When replicating the increase in US labor income inequality since
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the 1970s, he finds a decline in of the interest rate of 1%.
Furthermore, unlike the aforementioned contributions, my paper shows how the increase in
inequality may have caused both the increase in the indebtedness of the non-rich and the decline
of the natural rate. A link between the increase in inequality and rising indebtedness has been
argued by Rajan (2010) and modeled by Kumhof et al. (2015) in an endowment economy. I extend
their analysis by modeling the housing market and thus the main source of collateral used to secure
US household debt. This modification fleshes out the transmission from changes in the income
distribution to household indebtedness, as well as generating predictions regarding the effects on
the bottom 90% LTV and the value of the housing stock.
Other contributions investigating the potential drivers of the decline in the natural rate have
focused on the increase in life expectancy and the the old-age dependency ratio, and found those
factors to have an ongoing negative effect on the natural rate by increasing pension related saving
and the capital labor ratio, thereby reducing demand for capital goods (e.g. Eggertsson et al.
(2018), Bielecki et al. (2018) and Papetti (2018)).
Finally, my modeling approach forms part of a literature analyzing macroeconomic consequences
of household heterogeneity by dividing households into two or three distinct groups which differ
regarding important characteristics, for instance their consumption smoothing opportunities or asset
holdings (or lack thereof) and their impatience. Debortoli and Gali (2018), Bilbie (2018), Broer et
al. (2018), and Ravn and Sterk (2016) show that this approach captures relevant mechanisms and
dynamics absent from the representative agent model, while at the same time being much more
tractable and easier to interpret than conventional heterogenous agent models. Earlier examples of
this modeling strategy comprise Galí et. al. (2007) and Bilbiie (2008), as well as Iacoviello (2005).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops and analyses the simple
model without household borrowing. Section 3 develops the model with household borrowing and
a housing market, which I refer to as “full model”. Section 4 discusses the results in the full model,
including the aforementioned historical simulation of the decline of the income share of the bottom
90% of households over the 1981-2014 period.
2 A simple model
The model features two distinct household groups, namely rich and non-rich households, as well
as monopolistically competitive firms owned by rich households and employing rich and non-rich
household labor. The model thus precludes the possibility that the observed increase in income
inequality might be the consequence of greater income mobility of individual households between
different income groups. However, Kopczuck et al. (2010) and De Baecker et al. (2013) provide
evidence that increases in permanent (not transitory) earnings variance drove the increase in in-
equality observed in recent decades. Furthermore, Kopczuck et al. (2010) report that short and
long term income mobility has been either stable or declining since the 1950s.
4
2.1 Households
Throughout, I index rich households with the subscript S. Rich households derive utility from
consumption CS,t, and their stocks of safe real financial assets bS,t (consisting of government bonds).
Their objective function is thus given by
Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
βiS
[
C1−σSS,t+i
1− σSC
1−σS
S,t+i +
φb
1− σb (bS,t+i)
1−σb
]}
where βS denotes their utility discount factor, and φb, σS and σb are a non-negative constants. A
rich household’s budget constraint is given by
bS,t =
Rt−1
Πt
bS,t−1 + wS,tNS,t + Ξt − TS,t − CS,t
where Rt, wS,t, Ξt, TS,t and Πt denote the nominal interest rate on safe assets, the real wage, the
real profits firms, real lump sum taxes and the inflation rate, respectively. The assumption that
only the rich own firms and government bonds is motivated by the extreme concentration of stocks,
business ownership and bonds (e. g. Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2015)).
Preferences over wealth have been found useful, or indeed necessary, to explain a wide range of
phenomena, the most conventional example being liquidity preference used to explain the presence
of money in agents portfolios. Krishnamurthy and Vissing Jorgenson (2012) argue that liquidity
preference may extend to assets with a positive yield if they have money-like qualities, and provide
supporting evidence in the form of a positive relationship between the supply of US government
debt and the differential between its yields and the yield of other debt-securities. More recently,
preferences over safe assets have been shown to considerably alleviate the so called “forward guidance
puzzle”, i.e. the finding that in DSGE models, the effect of forward guidance is implausibly strong
(e.g. Rannenberg (2019), Michaillat and Saez (2018)).
A complimentary motivation is the so called “Capitalist Spirit” type argument, which says that
the rich derive utility from accumulating wealth in various forms due to the sense of prestige
and power it provides. Several authors have argued that “Capitalist Spirit” type preferences are
necessary to explain the saving behavior of rich households in US data. Kumhof et al. (2016) show
that preferences over wealth allow to replicate the empirical finding that wealthy households have
a positive marginal propensity to save out of an increase in their permanent income (see Dynan et
al. (2004) and Kumhof et al. (2016)). Furthermore, Carroll (2000) and Francis (2009) show that
the standard life cycle model substantially under-predicts the level of wealth rich households hold
relative to their permanent income, and that preferences over wealth eliminate this puzzle. Here I
adopt the “Capitalist Spirit” type rationale, which however does not rule out the liquidity preference
motive as far as preferences over real financial assets are concerned. From now on, I will refer to
the model where the rich derive utility from their wealth (i.e. φb > 0) on top of consumption as the
model with “Capitalist Spirit” type Preferences (CSP), while I refer to the φb = 0 case as NOCSP.
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The first order conditions with respect to consumption and government bonds are given by
ΛS,t =
1
CσSS,t
(1)
ΛS,t = βSEt
{
ΛS,t+1
Rt
Πt+1
}
+ φb (bS,t)
−σb (2)
where ΛS,t denotes the marginal utility of consumption. If φb > 0, φb (bS,t)
−σb represents an extra
marginal benefit from saving over and above the utility associated with the future consumption
opportunity saving entails (represented by βSEt
{
ΛS,t+1
Rt
Πt+1
}
). CSP weakens the effect of an
increase in permanent income and thus a decline of ΛS,t+1 on ΛS,t, since the two become less
than proportional. To gain some intuition, compare the bond market equilibrium in the CSP and
NOCSP case, assuming that the economy is initially in the steady state in both period t and t+ 1.
The presence of the extra benefit φb (bS,t)
−σb with CSP implies that for the bond market to clear,
the present value βS RtΠt+1 the household attaches to ΛS,t+1 -the net effect of the reward of waiting
and her impatience- has to be smaller than in the NOCSP case, thus reducing the importance
she attaches to a decline in ΛS,t+1. Furthermore, this weakening of intertemporal consumption
smoothing compounds the more distant in time the anticipated future consumption increase is
located, as ΛS,t+1 is no longer proportional to ΛS,t+2 either, and so on and so forth. As a result,
with CSP a one percent permanent increase in saver household income will ceteris paribus not cause
a one percent increase in consumption, but instead an increase in both saving and consumption.
The marginal propensity to save out of a permanent income increase will be larger the smaller the
curvature parameter σb.
Furthermore, the above implies that for φb > 0,
Rt <
1
Et
{
βΛS,t+1
ΛS,tΠt+1
} ≡ DISt (3)
i.e. the nominal interest rate may be smaller than the discount rate the household applies to future
income streams DISt.
I assume that non-rich households, denoted as CC, simply consume their disposable income.
Their behavior is thus described by
CCC,t = wCC,tNCC,t − TCC,t
Households are endowed with a fixed amount of hours NS and NCC they supply to firms.
6
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms owned by rich households which each
produce a variety j from a CES basked of goods. Retailer j combines labor supplied by the two
household types using a Cobb Douglas technology:
Yt (j) = AtN (j)
(1−ωCC−dCC,t)
S,t N (j)
(ωCC+dCC,t)
CC,t (4)
where dCC,t represents a shock to the production elasticity of rich and non-rich households which I
will use to generate increases in household income inequality not accompanied by a decline in the
labor share. A negative value of dCC,t lowers the demand for non-rich household labor and thus
their real wage, while increasing the demand for rich household labor. The shock can be viewed as a
proxy for skill biased technological change and the “Race between education and technology” (Goldin
and Katz (2007)). Note that under my assumption of flexible prices (and thus an exogenous price
markup) the shock will not change the overall labor income share. The firms first order conditions
are given by
wS,t = mct (1− ωCC − dCC,t) Yt
NS,t
(5)
wCC,t = mct (ωCC + dCC,t)
Yt
NCC,t
(6)
1
µP + dµ,t
= mct (7)
where µP denotes the steady state markup of prices over marginal costs and dµ,t a shock to the
markup, which I will use to generate increases in inequality which are accompanied by a decline in
the labor share.
2.3 Government
There is a government consuming Gt units of output. It levies lump sum taxes on households
in order to keep the government debt-to-GDP ratio and the GDP share of government expendi-
ture constant. For simplicity, I assume that fiscal policy keeps total lump sum taxes of non-rich
households constant. Hence fiscal policy is described by
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bgov,t =
Rt−1
Πt
bgov,t−1 +Gt − TS,t − TCC,t (8)
Targetbgov2GDP =
bgov,t
4Yt
(9)
TargetG2GDP =
Gt
Yt
(10)
TCC,t = TCC (11)
where Targetbgov2GDP and TargetG2GDP and denote the governments targets for its debt-to-GDP
ratio and the GDP share of government expenditure on goods and services, respectively. The central
bank successfully pursues a perfect inflation target:
Πt = Π (12)
implying that the actual real interest rate equals the natural rate.
2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in goods, capital and labor markets implies
Yt = CS,t + CCC,t +Gt (13)
bS,t = bgov,t (14)
NCC,t = NCC (15)
NO,t = NO (16)
The only exogenous variables are the shocks to the production elasticity of households dCC,t and
the price markup dµ,t.
2.5 Calibration
Without loss of generality, I assume a labor endowment (NCC , NS) of 13 for both household types.
I assume a price markup µp of 1.25 (see Table 1). I calibrate the remaining parameters such
that the steady state values in the model match the empirical targets reported in Table 2. In
the model without CSP type preferences (i.e. where φb = 0), there are in total 5 parameters
calibrated in this fashion, marked with a *, namely the rich consumption utility curvature σS , the
rich household discount factor βS , the non-rich share in labor income ωCC and the governments
expenditure and debt targets Targetbgov2GDP and TargetG2GDP . The empirical targets are the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which I set to 0.5, in line with the mean estimate reported
in the meta-analysis of Havranek (2015), the real ex-post federal funds rate, the GDP-share of
8
Table 1: Parameters simple model
Parameter Parameter name Value NOCSP (θ = 1) Value CSP (θ = 0.97)
βS Rich household utility discount factor 0.9951* 0.9652*
σS Rich utility curvature consumption 2* 2*
NCC , NS Labor endowments 13
1
3
ωCC Non-rich share in total labor income 0.85* 0.85*
µP Price markup 1.25 1.25
Targetbgov2GDP Gov. debt-to-GDP ratio 0.38* 0.38*
TargetG2GDP Government-expenditure-to-GDP ratio 0.2* 0.2*
TCC
TCC+TS
Share of the non-rich in the total tax burden 67% 67%
σb Rich utility curvature of real financial assets - 0.19*
φb Rich utility weight on real financial assets 0 0.32*
Table 2: Targets simple model
Target Value NOCSP Value CSP Source
IES 1
σS
0.5 0.5 Havranek (2015)
Real short term interest rate R
Π
2% 2% Federal Funds rate minus Core-PCE inflation, APR, (1973-1980 average), FRED
G
Y
20% 20% Government expenditure GDP share (1973-1980 average), BEA
bgov,S,
4Y
44% 44% Federal Debt held by the public, percentage of GDP, (1981-2016 average)
Non-rich income share
wCCNCC
Y+bgov
(
R
Π
−1
) 67% 67% Bottom 90% net national income share, pre-tax, (1973-1980 average), WID
MPS top 10% 0 0.52 Target CSP case: Dynan et al (2004)
Discounting wedge θ 1.0 0.97 Target CSP case: Literature discount rates (see Table 3)
Note: FRED=Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Database. BEA=Bureau of Economic Analysis.
IES=Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution. WID=World Inequality Database, see Alvaredo et al. (2016) and Piketty et
al. (2018) for the US data used here for details.
government expenditure, the government debt-to-GDP ratio, and the income share of the bottom
90% of households, which I assume to be the real world counterparts of the non-rich in the model.
I compute all targets as averages over the 1973-1980 period, as the historical simulation of Section
4.2 starts in 1981 (the bottom 90% income share is essentially constant during 1973-1980), with
the exception of the government debt-to-GDP ratio and the government expenditure share. These
targets I compute as averages over the 1981-2016 period since I hold these variables constant
throughout the paper. Finally, set the share of the non-rich in the total tax burden equal to their
pre-tax income share.
In the model with CSP, I calibrate the two CSP related parameters (φb, σb) by using two
additional empirical targets. The first target is an estimate of the “discounting wedge” θt, defined
as
θt ≡ Rt
DISt
where DISt denotes the nominal individual discount rate which the household applies to future
nominal income streams (defined by equation 3), with θ = βS RΠ in the steady-state. I assume that
θ = 0.97 and discuss this choice below. Note that θ < 1 implies a smaller value of βS than in the
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NOCSP case (which corresponds to θ = 1), given the unchanged target for the real interest rate.
Conditional on an assumption for σb, the steady state relationship implied by the Euler equation
(20) allows to back out φb as
φb = (1− θ) ΛS (bS)σb (17)
To obtain an empirical target for calibrating θt, I draw on estimates of the -time varying-
nominal individual discount rate which the household applies to future nominal income streams,
DISt =
1
Et
{
βΛS,t+1
ΛS,tΠt+1
} (as the constant discount rate the household applies to future utility streams
βS is unobservable). All available estimates of DISt are point estimates (rather than time series).
However, given such a point estimate of DISt, I exploit the fact that for sufficiently small values of
φb (i.e. implying θ smaller than but close to one), θt = RtDISt is approximately constant across time.
This property is a consequence of intertemporal substitution by the household: An increase in Rt
shifts consumption from t to t+ 1, thus increasing DISt.1 Hence θ ≈ RtDISt . Therefore I estimate θ
using point estimates of the personal discount rate and an appropriate market interest rate.
Economists have attempted to estimate the personal discount rate at least since Friedman’s
(1957) seminal tests of the permanent income hypotheses by studying economic agents behavior
when faced with a variety of inter temporal trade-offs (see Table 3). These range from trading
off the energy efficiency and price price of household appliances (Ruderman et al. (1984)) to the
effects of paying bonuses (Cylke et al. (1982)) or severance packages (Warner and Pleeter (2001))
as a lump sump sums instead of installments, as well as field experiments where probants choose
between an immediate payment and a larger deferred payment (Harrison et al. (2002)). As can
be obtained from Table 3, the elicited discount rates are quite high, although typically below the
estimate of 33% of Friedman (1962,1957). What is more, they also typically exceed safe market
interest rates on safe investments with a comparable maturity observed at the time the discount
rates were elicited, yielding an implied value of θ smaller than one, sometimes substantially so. The
contributions of Harrison et al. (2002) and Warner and Pleeter (2001) are of particular relevance in
my context. Harrison et al. (2002) report estimates for (income-) rich households, while Warner and
Pleeter’s (2002) elicit discount rate of officers of the United States armed forces choosing between
two severance packages during the 1992-1995 military draw-down.2
Finally, following Kumhof et al. (2015), the second target I use to calibrate the CSP-type
preferences is an estimate of the rich household’s marginal propensity to save (MPS) out of an
increase in their permanent income. Here I draw on the evidence by Dynan et al. (2004), who
1More formally, rearranging equation (20) as 1 − φbb
−σb
S,t
ΛS,t
= βRtEt
ΛS,t+1
Πt+1ΛS,t
, defining θt = RtDISt = 1 −
φbb
−σb
S,t
ΛS,t
and linearizing yields dθt =
φb(bS)
−σb
ΛS
(
ΛˆS,t + σbbˆS,t
)
= (1− θ)
(
σbbˆS,t − 1σS CˆS,t
)
. Hence for 1 − θ close to zero
and reasonable calibrations of σS and σb even large deviations of CˆS,t and bˆS,t would lead to tiny movements in θt,
implying that θ ≈ Rt
DISt
is a good approximation.
2The authors report that virtually all of the officers in their sample have a college degree, while according to the
Current Population survey the same was true for only 24.5% of individuals in the same age group.
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estimate the MPS for households in the top 5% of the income distribution. To compute the rich
household MPS, I perform a microsimulation, described in Appendix A.
2.6 An increase in inequality in the simple model
All simulations in this paper are performed using the deterministic nonlinear solution algorithm of
the Matlab package Dynare (see Adjemian et al. (2011)). Figure 1 displays separately the effect of
a permanent increase in the markup (black lines) and the labor income share of rich households (red
lines line). Both shocks are calibrated such that the share of non-rich households in total household
income declines by 1 percentage point on impact. In this highly simplified model, both distribution
shocks also have effects of identical magnitudes on the consumption of rich (which increases) and
non-rich households (which decreases), while the labor share is affected only by the markup shock.
Furthermore, CSP do not change the effect of the increase in inequality on any of the variables
except for the interest rate and the non-rich income share. The interest rate declines by about 1
percentage point. Hence, in the presence of CSP, the increase in rich households permanent income
does not in itself trigger an increase in rich household consumption of the same size. Since rich
household wealth bs,t is constant as a result of the government’s fiscal policy (see equation 9), for
bond and goods markets to clear, the interest rate has to decline (see equation 2). The interest rate
decline partially compensates for the increase in labor or profit income of the rich, implying that
the non-rich income share recovers by about 0.2 percentage points in the second quarter.
3 The full model
The full model allows rich households to invest in financial intermediary deposits, physical capital
and housing (on top of the government bonds of the simple model). They derive utility from
all of these assets. Non-rich households derive utility from consumption and housing and borrow
from financial intermediaries. These extensions constitute a robustness checks of the simple models
predictions by offering rich households alternative asset classes, which might a priori be expected
to reduce the impact of rising inequality on the interest rate on government bonds. Furthermore,
they allow to generate predictions regarding the impact of rising inequality on the borrowing and
LTV of the bottom 90%, which likewise displayed trends during the 1981-2016 period.
3.1 Rich households
Rich households derive utility from consumption CS,t, their stocks of safe real financial assets bS,t
(consisting of financial intermediary deposits and government bonds), the value of their physical
capital QtKt and their housing stock HS,t. Their objective function is thus given by
12
Figure 1: Impact of a permanent increase in inequality - simple model
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Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
βiS
[
C1−σSS,t+i
1− σSC
1−σS
S,t+i +
φH,S
1− σH,SH
1−σH,S
S,t+i +
φb
1− σb (bS,t+i)
1−σb +
φK
1− σK (Qt+iKt+i)
1−σK
]}
From now on, I will refer to the model where the rich derive utility from real financial assets and
physical capital (i.e. φb, φK > 0) on top of housing and consumption as the CSP model, while I
refer to the case where the rich do not derive utility from these two assets (φb = φK = 0) as the
model without CSP (NOCSP). A rich household’s budget constraint is given by
bS,t =
Rt−1
Πt
bS,t−1 + wS,tNS,t + rK,tKt−1 + Ξt
−QH,t (HS,t −HS,t−1)− TS,t − CS,t −
(
It +Kt−1Φ
(
It
Kt−1
))
with
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It
where rK,t, QH,t, Ξt, It and δ denote the the real capital rental, the real house price, real profits of
the firms, investment and the depreciation rate of physical capital, respectively. Φ
(
It
Kt−1
)
denotes
convex capital stock adjustment costs, with
Φ
(
It
Kt−1
)
=
I
2
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
(18)
The first order conditions with respect to consumption, financial assets, capital, investment and
housing are given by
ΛS,t =
1
CσSS,t
(19)
ΛS,t = βSEt
{
ΛS,t+1
Rt
Πt+1
}
) + φbb
−σb
S,t (20)
Qt = Et
{
βS
ΛS,t+1
ΛS,t
[
rK,t+1 +
It+1
Kt
Φ′
(
It+1
Kt
)
− Φ
(
It+1
Kt
)
+ (1− δ)Qt+1
]
+Qt
φK (QtKt)
−σK
ΛS,t
}
(21)
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1 +
(
Φ′
(
It
Kt−1
))
= Qt (22)
QH,t =
φH,S
H
σH,S
S,t ΛS,t
+ βSEt
{
ΛS,t+1
ΛS,t
QH,t+1
}
(23)
where Qt denotes the real value of an additional unit of capital to the household.
3.2 Borrower (non-rich) households
Borrowing households are indexed with CC and derive utility from consumption and housing. The
objective of a borrower household is given by
Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
βiCC
[
C1−σCCCC,t+i
1− σCC C
1−σS
CC,t+i +
φH,CC,t+i
1− σH,CCH
1−σH,CC
S,t+i
]}
where I allow the utility weight on housing to be time varying (but exogenous to the individual
borrower household). I assume that non-rich households are sufficiently impatient such that their
borrowing is positive in equilibrium. Furthermore, I assume that borrowing is subject to a costly
friction, possibly in the form of a default cost. The friction becomes more severe the larger a house-
hold’s Loan to Value (LTV) ratio bCC,tHCC,tQH,t+1 , possibly because the likelihood of (strategic) default
increases. The financial intermediary passes these costs fully to borrower households, implying that
the borrowers expected total cost of borrowing Et {RL,t+1} on her period t borrowing is determined
by
Et {RL,t+1}
Rt
=
(
1 + Et
{
f
(
bCC,t
HCC,tQH,t+1
)})
(24)
with f ′ () > 0. These assumptions capture in a simple fashion the empirical finding that non-
rich households are more likely to be subject to borrowing constraints, but that their constraint
is lessened by an increase in the value of their home, as argued by Mian and Sufi (2014, 2011).
In Appendix B, I show that a positive relationship between the households LTV and her cost of
borrowing may be microfounded by assuming idiosyncratic shocks to the value of a borrowers house,
costly strategic default, and that the borrower’s house serves as collateral in a state contingent debt
contract, following Onorante et al. (2017). The simulation results I discuss in Section 4 of the main
text are broadly robust to adopting this microfoundation (see Appendix C for details).
The budget constrained of borrowing households is given by
RL,t
Πt
bCC,t−1 + CCC,t +QH,t (HCC,t −HCC,t−1) = bCCt + wCC,tNCC,t − TCC,t (25)
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The FOCs with respect to consumption CCC,t, real loans bCC,t, housing HCC,t, and the expected
loan interest rate RL,t+1 imply
ΛCC,t =
1
CσCCCC,t
(26)
ΛCC,t = βCCEt
ΛCC,t+1
RL,t+1
Πt+1
+
dRL,t+1
dbCC,t
(
bCC,t
HCC,tQH,t+1
)
Πt+1
bCC,t
 (27)
QH,t =
φH,CC,t
ΛCC,tH
σH,CC
CC,t
+ βCCEt
ΛCC,t+1ΛCC,t
QH,t+1 − dRL,t+1dHCC,t
(
bCC,t
HCC,tQH,t+1
)
Πt+1
bCC,t
 (28)
where dRL,t+1dbCC
(
bCC,t
HCC,tQH,t+1
)
denotes the effect of an increase in borrowing bCC,t on the loan rate
RL,t+1 implied by the loan supply curve (24). Hence when trading off today’s and tomorrow’s con-
sumption, borrower households take into account both the expected interest rate on the additional
unit of borrowing RL,t+1Πt+1 and the expected increase in the interest rate burden on their existing
stock of borrowing dRL,t+1dbCC
(
bCC,t
HCC,tQH,t+1
)
resulting from the worsening of the borrowing friction.
Correspondingly, dRL,t+1dHCC,t
(
bCC,t
HCC,tQH,t+1
)
denotes the implied (negative) effect of an increase in the
housing stock on the loan rate (holding bCC,t constant). I assume that f () is described by a simple
linear function
f (LTVt) = χCCLTVt (29)
with LTVt =
bCC,t
HCC,tQH,t+1
.
Finally, I assume that the utility weight on housing of the non-rich φH,CC,t may depend on
lagged rich household total consumption (including housing consumption) CT,S,t−1
φH,CC,t = φH,CC
((
CT,S,t−1
CS
)νcascade)σH,CC
(30)
CT,S,t = CS,t +
(
φH,S
ΛS,tH
σH,S
S,t
)
HS,t (31)
with φH,CC > 0 and νcascade = 0. Hence a one percent increase in lagged total rich household con-
sumption CT,S,t−1 increases the housing demand of the non-rich by νcascade percent.
(
φH,S
1
ΛS,tHS,t
)
denotes rich households’ “shadow rent”, i.e. the value of an additional unit of housing to rich house-
holds expressed in consumption units. The motivation for this assumption is the so called “catching
up with the richer Joneses (Drechsel-Grau and Schmid 2014)” type behavior. Specifically, there
is microeconometric evidence that households care about their consumption relative to a reference
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group richer than themselves, and that an increase in the consumption of that richer reference group
boosts their own consumption (see Kuhn et al. (2011), Drechsel-Grau and Schmid (2014), Bertrand
and Morse (2016)), thus giving rise to so called “consumption cascades” (Frank et al. 2014). I limit
the consumption cascade effect to the non-rich utility from housing due to the evidence in Bertrand
and Morse (2016), who find that in response to a one percent increase increase in the (total) con-
sumption of the top 10% of households in a given state, the bottom 90% increase both the amount
of housing services they consume and the share of housing in their consumption basket.3 They
provide evidence that the disproportional effect on non-rich housing consumption maybe related to
the high visibility and thus status intensity of housing consumption. In the historical simulation of
Section 4.2, this feature will help the model to match the upward trend of the value of the housing
stock relative to GDP and the bottom 90% debt-to-income ratio observed during the pre-crisis
period by boosting the effect of rising inequality on housing demand, which in turn relaxes the
borrowing constraint of non-rich households by lowering their LTVt.
3.3 Firms
The Firms’ technology now features physical capital and is thus given by
Yt (j) = AtN (j)
(1−ωCC−dCC,t)(1−αK)
S,t N (j)
(ωCC+dCC,t)(1−αK)
CC,t K (j)
αK
t (32)
implying the following FOCs:
rK,t = mctαK
Yt
Kt−1
(33)
wS,t = mct (1− αK) (1− ωCC − dCC,t) Yt
NS,t
(34)
wCC,t = mct (1− αK) (ωCC + dCC,t) Yt
NCC,t
(35)
1
µP + dµ,t
= mct (36)
3.4 Government
I assume that the government sets the share of non-rich agents in total lump sum taxes payable
equal to their share in total net national households income:
3See Table 2, column 3, and Internet Appendix Table A9, rows 2 and 4.
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TargetTCC2Tt =
TCC,t
TS,t + TCC,t
(37)
TargetTCC2Tt =
wCC,tNCC,t − RL,tΠt bCC,t−1
Yt − It − bCC,t−1f (LTVt) Rt−1Πt +
(
Rt−1
Πt
− 1
)
bgov,t−1
(38)
These equations replace equation (11), while the remaining equations of the government sector
remain unchanged.
3.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the goods market, the market for safe assets and the housing market are given by
Yt = CS,t + CCC,t +
(
It + Φ
(
It
Kt−1
)
Kt−1
)
+Gt (39)
+ bCC,t−1f (LTVt)
Rt−1
Πt
bS,t = bCC,t + bgov,t (40)
H = HS,t +HCC,t (41)
where I assume a constant economy wide housing stock H . Thus the endogenous variables of the
model are determined by (19)-(41) and (5)-(12). The only exogenous variables are the shocks to
the production elasticity of households dCC,t and the price markup dµ,t.
3.6 Calibration
I set the capital stock adjustment cost curvature I = 7, in line with the estimate of Cummins et
al. (2006) (see Table 5). The rate of depreciation δ equals 0.025. In line with the literature on
housing in DSGE models, I assume a partial equilibrium income effect on housing demand of 1%
(i.e. σH,S = σH,CC = σCC = σS (e.g. Iacoviello (2005, 2014), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Clerc
et al. (2015)). Without loss of generality, the labor endowments are set to 13 for both agent types.
As in the simple model, I set the remaining parameters in order to match a range of empirical
targets, reported in Table 4, with the rich corresponding to the top 10% of households. In the full
model without CSP-type preferences, there are in total 11 parameters calibrated in this fashion
(σS , βS , βCC , φH,S , φH,CC , µp, αK , ωCC , TargetG2GDP , Targetbgov2GDP , χCC). They are pinned
down by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (as estimated by Havranek (2015)), the real
short term interest rate, the borrower debt-to-annual income ratio, the residential-housing-stock-to-
annual-GDP ratio, the share of borrowers in total residential real estate, the labor share, the share
of non-residential fixed investment in GDP, the share of borrowers in total net national income, the
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GDP share of government expenditure on goods and services, the government-debt-to-GDP ratio,
and a measure of the spread of the mortgage rate over the risk free rate.
The CSP-type preferences of the rich are now described by four parameters, σb, φb, σK and φK ,
two more than in the simple model of Section 2. Therefore I ad two additional empirical targets
to calibrate the preference parameters, on top of the marginal propensity to save of the rich and
the discounting wedge θ. The first is the spread between the return on capital rK − δ and the real
risk free rate RΠ . I measure this spread as a simple average of an empirical estimate of the external
finance premium and the equity risk premium (see Table 4 for details). The second is the evidence
of Gale and Orszag (2004), Engen and Hubbard (2004) and Laubach (2009) on the effect of a one
percentage point increase in the government debt-to-annual-GDP ratio on the real interest rate on
US government bonds, for which these authors find a range of 0.03 to 0.06 percentage points. I
assume that the corresponding model counterpart is the effect of a one percentage point permanent
increase of the government debt-to-annual-GDP ratio on the steady-state real interest rate. In
practice, the value of dInterest rate gov. bondsdGov. Debt ratio implied by the model is closely linked to the value of σb.4
Unless explicitly mentioned, I assume that there is no effect of rich household consumption on
the utility borrower household derive from housing (νcascade = 0) . Otherwise, I set νcascade = 0.7,
in line with the evidence of Bertrand and Morse (2016), who find that a 1% increase in the total
consumption of the top 10% households increases the consumption of housing services by the bottom
90% of households living in the same state by about 0.7%.
4 Results in the full model
In this section, using the model developed in Section 3, I first investigate the effect of one-off wage
inequality and price markup shocks (Section 4.1), and then perform a historical simulation which
replicates the decline of the US labor share and the bottom 90% national income share over the
1981-2016 period. As shown in Appendix C, the results based on the model of Section 3 are broadly
robust to explicitly modeling the borrowing friction assumed above.
4.1 A one-off permanent increase in inequality
I first consider the effect of a permanent decline in the share of borrower households in total labor
income, caused by a permanent decline (increase) in the elasticity of output with respect to the
labor supplied by borrower (rich) households, i.e. dCC,t becomes permanently negative (see Figure
2). I calibrate the value of dCC,t such that the on-impact decline of the borrower household income
share equals approximately 1%. Without CSP (solid black line), rich households increase their
consumption and housing demand on impact by approximately the magnitude of their permanent
4Note that the value of dInterest rate gov. bondsdGov. Debt ratio implied by the calibration is at the upper bound of the empirical range.
Targeting a lower value would imply a smaller value of σb and a larger value of σK , and would strengthen the results
discussed in Section 4.
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Table 5: Full model, parameter values
Parameter Parameter name Value NOCSP (θ = 1) Value CSP (θ = 0.97)
βS Rich utility discount factor 0.9951∗ 0.9652∗
βCC Borrower utility discount factor 0.9868∗ 0.9868∗
σS , σCC Utility curvature consumption 2* 2*
σS,H , σCC,H Utility curvature housing 2 2
NCC , NS Labor endowments 13
1
3
φH,S Rich utility weight on housing 0.03* 1.25∗
φH,CC Borrower utility weight on housing 0.44∗ 0.44∗
νcascade Consumption cascade 0 0/0.7
µp Price markup 1.26∗ 1.26∗
αK Output elasticity w.r.t. capital 0.21∗ 0.21∗
ωCC Borrower share in labor income 0.95∗ 0.95∗
δ Depreciation rate physical capital 0.025 0.025
I Capital adjustment cost curvature 7 7
χCC Financial intermediation cost, linear 0.0136* 0.0136*
Targetbgov2GDP Government debt target 44% 44%
TargetG2GDP Government expenditure share target 20% 20%
σb CSP: Utility curvature, real financial assets − 0.5∗
σK CSP: Utility curvature, physical capital − 4∗
φb CSP: Utility weight on real financial assets 0∗ 3.13∗
φK CSP: Utility weight on physical capital 0∗ 72.68∗
Note: Values marked with a * are set to match the targets reported in Table 4.
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income change, similar to the simple model (Figure 1). Similarly, borrower households lower their
consumption by approximately the decrease in their permanent income, and permanently reduce
their borrowing and housing demand. As a result, without CSP, the effect on the natural interest
rate is small, and actually positive on impact before returning to zero.
By contrast, with CSP (dotted black line), rich households increase their consumption by only
half as much as without CSP, implying that in order to equilibrate capital and goods markets, the
natural interest rate declines. The decline in the natural rate is initially fully passed on to borrowers,
which motivates them to postpone the decline in their consumption of goods and housing services,
implying a higher trajectory of borrower consumption and housing demand than in the NOCSP case,
as well as an increase in their debt. At the same time, the lower interest rate than in the absence
of CSP increases the relative housing demand of both rich and non-rich households, implying that
the value of the housing stock increases substantially more than without CSP. The increase in
house prices tends to relax the borrower households borrowing constraint, which tends to further
strengthen their consumption and housing demand. As a result, their debt-to-income ratio steeply
increases, while their LTV actually decreases during the first year before turning positive.
Apart from expanding their lending to borrower households via the financial intermediary, saver
households also use their additional income to increase their investment, as the decline in the safe
interest rate and the decline in the marginal utility of consumption relative to the marginal utility
of physical capital renders physical capital relatively more attractive. As a result, the physical
capital stock and GDP increase.
To illustrate the role of borrowing friction, the graph also displays the response of the economy
to the wage inequality shock assuming a loan supply curve twice as steep as in the baseline case (i.e.
χCC = 0.0276). With steeper loan supply, an increase in inequality generates a smaller increase in
borrowing than with linear loan supply, as well as of the LTV in the medium and long run (see the
black cross line). The smaller increase in borrowing implies that the natural rate has to decline by
more to equilibrate capital and goods markets.
Allowing for a role of spending cascades (νcascade = 0.7) on top of CSP strongly raises the effect
of an increase in wage inequality on household debt and the value of the housing stock (see the
black diamond lines). The increase in rich household consumption increases the housing demand of
borrowers, which they fund via additional debt. The stronger rise of the house price implies that, in
spite of their higher debt trajectory, their LTV is actually smaller than in the absence of spending
cascades (compare the black dotted and the black diamond line). By contrast, the observed decline
in the natural interest rate is slightly smaller.
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Figure 2: Impact of a permanent increase in inequality
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Note: The black lines display the effect of a one-off permanent decline in the elasticity of output with respect to the labor
supplied by non-rich (rich) households (dCC,t permanently declines, see equation (32)). The red lines display the effect
of a one-off increase in the price markup (dµ,t permanently increases). CSP refers to the model with Capitalist Spirit
type Preferences. “Steeper loan supply” refers to the case where χCC = 0.0276, i.e. double the value displayed in Table
5. “cascades” refers to the scenario where the effect of rich household total consumption on non-rich housing demand (see
equation (30)) is active (i.e. νcascade > 0). The safe interest rate Rt and the risk spread EtRL,t+1 − Rt are expressed as
Annualized Percentage Rates. The borrower debt-to-income ratio is based on annualized borrower income. The borrower-
debt-to-GDP ratio is based on annualized GDP.
An increase in inequality driven by a permanent rise in the price markup (the red lines) reduces
the demand for capital goods by the monopolistically competitive firms and thus the capital rental
rK,t earned by households (see equations (7) and (33)) and thus their incentive to invest. The
23
decline in in their investment expenditure allows rich households to increase their consumption
even more than for an increase in wage inequality, implying that house prices now increase more
due to a larger wealth effect on rich households housing demand. Apart from these differences, the
impact of the shock is very similar to the just discussed effect of an increase in wage inequality.
The same is true for the effect of allowing for CSP, which again implies, inter alia, a decline in
the natural rate, an increase in borrower household debt, an increase in house prices exceeding the
increase observed in the absence of CSP and a higher trajectory for investment due to the lower
real interest rate and the increase in the marginal utility of physical capital relative to the marginal
utility of consumption.
Finally, note that due to the existence of additional uses for the savings of rich households not
present in the simple model of Section 2 (i.e. residential housing, physical capital, lending to the
non-rich via financial intermediaries), the simulated decline in the safe real interest rate is smaller
than in Figure 1. Nevertheless, as discussed in the following section, when the actual decline of
the income share of the bottom 90% of households over the 1981-2014 period are replicated in the
model, the resulting decline in the natural rate is substantial.
4.2 Simulation of the empirically observed increase in inequality
Using the model with CSP, I now replicate two stylized facts of the US income distribution over
the 1981-2016 period. The first of these is the recent decline of the US labor share, which starts
at around the late 1990s (see Figure 3 first panel, the solid red line). In order to match the path
of the labor share, I assume a sequence of of unexpected permanent positive shocks to the price
markup dµ,t. Barkai (2017), De Loecker and Eckhout (2017), Gutierrez (2017) and Hall (2018)
provide evidence that the decline in the US labor share can be attributed to an increase in product
market price markups (rather than an increase in the role of physical capital in production). In
order to remove purely cyclical labor share fluctuations, I match an 8 year moving average of the
labor share. The peak increase in the price markup in the simulation equals 0.14, which is less
than estimated by Hall (2018), and much less than estimated by Barkai (2017) and De Loecker and
Eckhout (2017).
The second stylized fact is the decline of the pre-tax national income share of the bottom
90% of households reported in the World Inequality Database (WID) up until 2014. While the
model abstracts from the potential role of progressive income taxation in attenuating the effect of
rising pre-tax inequality on household finances, the bottom 90% post-tax disposable income share
displays a very similar trend.5 The decline in the bottom 90% income share began already in the
early 1980s (see the first panel of Figure 3 , the solid black line) and until the early 2000s was
mainly driven labor income dispersion (see Piketty et al. (2018)), consistent with the absence of
5Specifically, by 2014, the bottom 90% pre-tax national income share has declined by 12.7 percentage points,
while the post-tax disposable national income share has declined by 10.7 percentage points. The post-tax disposable
income series aims to describe post-tax, post transfer inequality, see Alvaredo et al. (2016).
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a trend in the labor share during that period. This finding is also supported by microevidence.6
Therefore, given the assumed sequence of price markup shocks and their effect on the household
income distribution, I then assume a sequence of unexpected negative permanent shocks to the
the relative labor productivity of borrower households dCC,t calibrated to set the path of the non-
rich household income share in the model equal to the bottom 90% income share in the data.
Since the WID data is available at an annual frequency only and my focus is on the trends in any
case, I assume that the changes in dCC,t and dµ,t occur every four quarters, starting with the first
simulation quarter.
As can be obtained from the second panel of Figure 3, the simulated increase in inequality
generates a decline in the natural interest rate by between 3 and 4 percentage points over the 1981-
2016 period, depending on whether I allow for spending cascades. The simulation is thus able to
replicate the downward trend of the part of the natural rate attributed by Laubach and Williams
(2015) to factors other than trend GDP growth (labeled “z_LW” in the graph).
It should be remembered that the model’s only drivers are the two aforementioned shocks to the
income distribution, and that the model represents a hypothetical flexible price equilibrium, i.e. a
situation where the output gap is closed. It thus abstracts from a multitude of potentially relevant
influences, and would not be expected a priori to match the data year by year. That being said, the
simulation speaks to a number of important trends observed during the 1980-2016 period. It closely
tracks the upward trend of the bottom 90% of households mortgage debt-to-income ratio from the
early 1980s until about 2001 (see Figure 4). While the simulation lags somewhat behind the data
during the US housing price boom, it nevertheless replicates almost four fifths of the peak increase
of the bottom 90% debt-to-income ratio (observed around 2007/2010) compared to its 1980 value.
The simulation roughly tracks the rising trend of the bottom 90% LTV observed in the data up
until 2010. During the following years, the model without spending cascades generates higher LTV
trajectory than observed in the data, however this overprediction largely disappears if I allow for
spending cascades.
The model also generates an empirically relevant rising trend of the nominal-residential housing-
stock-to-GDP ratio and the household mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio (see Figure 5). Apart from a
rising trend, in the data both variables display substantial volatility, especially post 2001, which
my simple simulation exercise cannot capture. Nevertheless, the model with spending cascades
matches about two thirds of the peak increase of the residential-housing-stock-to-GDP and the
household mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio compared to their respective 1980 values (attained around
2008). Hence the model developed above is able to broadly match the post 1980 downward trend
of the natural rate of interest estimated by Laubach and Williams (2016), the upward trend of
measures of the observed increase of the indebtedness of the bottom 90% of households, and (if to a
lesser extend) macro-level measures of the increase in household debt, as well as the upward trend
of the value of the residential housing stock.
6At the microlevel, the increase in US labor earnings has been documented using different data sources for instance
by Kopczuk et al. (2010) and De Backer (2013)
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Figure 3: Simulation 1981-2016 - Income distribution and natural interest rate
Note: The label “model” indicates the results of simulation using the model developed in Section 3. The simulation subjects
the model to a sequence of unexpected but permanent shocks to the price markup dµ,t and the labor income share of non-
rich households dCC,t calibrated to replicate the empirically observed path of the labor share and the share of the bottom
90% of households in net national income. Changes in dCC,t and dµ,t occur every four quarters, starting with the first
simulation quarter. The line labelled “model, cascades” indicates an effect of rich household total consumption on non-rich
housing demand (i.e. νcascade > 0, see equation (30)). Note that the corresponding 1980 value has been subtracted from
all displayed series. Data sources:
• rstar_LW denotes the Natural rate estimated by Laubach and Williams (2015). z_LW denotes the component of
rstar_LW attributed to factors other than trend GDP growth. Estimates were downloaded from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Francisco web-page.
• Labor share, data: Labor share non-farm business sector, BLS, 8 year moving average.
• Bottom 90% income share, data: Bottom 90% of households share in pre-tax net national income, World Inequality
Database.
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Figure 4: Simulation 1981-2016 - Borrower debt-to-income ratio and LTV
Note: See the note below Figure 3 for details on the meaning of the labels “Model” and “cascades”. Note that the corre-
sponding 1980 value has been subtracted from all displayed series. Data sources:
• Bottom 90% debt-to-income ratio and LTV, data: The 1989-2016 values are based on summary statistics provided
by the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances 1989-2016 in excel format.
– Bottom 90% mean income: Table 1
– Bottom 90% mean mortgage debt (secured by primary residence): Table 13 and Table 13 means.
– Bottom 90% mean home value (primary residence): Table 13 and Table 13 means.
• Regarding the computation of the 1983 value, see the note below Table 4.
27
Figure 5: Simulation 1981-2016 - Nominal housing stock and total mortgage debt-to-
GDP ratios
Note: See the note below Figure 3 for details on the meaning of the labels “Model” and “cascades”. Note that the corre-
sponding 1980 value has been subtracted from all displayed series. Data sources:
• Nominal residential housing stock-to-GDP ratio PtQH,tHtPtYt : Own calculation based on data from the Federal Reserve
Board/Flow of Funds, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 8 year moving average.
• Nominal household-mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio PtbCC,tPtYt : Own calculation based on data from the Federal Reserve
Board/Flow of Funds, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 8 year moving average.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, I formally link four empirical trends observed during the post 1980 period: The
upward trend in the income share of the top 10% of US households, the downward trend of the
natural rate of interest, as estimated by Laubach and Williams (2016), the simultaneous increase in
measures of the indebtedness of the bottom 90% of households, and the increase in the value of the
residential housing stock relative to GDP. I do so by developing a model with two household groups,
the bottom 90% and the top 10%, where rich households have Capitalist Spirit type Preferences
(CSP) over their wealth. I first show that in an economy where the bottom 90% are hand-to-mouth
consumers and the only asset available to the rich are government bonds, the natural rate declines
strongly in response to a decline in the bottom 90% income share in the presence of CSP, regardless
of whether the decline is caused by an increase in the price markup or an increase in the relative
demand for rich household labor. The non-rich lower their consumption by the amount of their
income decline, while at the initial interest rate, the rich attempt to save part of the increase in
their permanent income. Thus the interest rate needs to decline to equilibrate the government bond
market and thus reduce equilibrium saving of the rich to zero.
I then extend the assets available to the rich in the model by allowing for home ownership by
both income groups and a housing market, a credit market where the non-rich borrow from the
rich via financial intermediaries using their home as collateral, and physical capital as an additional
factor of production owned by the rich. In this setup, in the presence of CSP a given increase in
inequality continues to lower the natural rate, though less than as in the simple model. The main
reason for the smaller decline in the natural rate is that the non-rich postpone the decline in their
consumption of goods and housing services by increasing their borrowing in response to the lower
interest rate they face. Therefore the house price increases as well, which contributes to relaxing
the borrowing constraint faced by the non-rich. By contrast, without CSP, an increase in inequality
does not lower the natural rate and causes a decline in household borrowing.
I then replicate the decline in bottom 90% income share observed over the 1981-2014 period
and the post 2001 decline in the labor share (i.e. the increase in functional income inequality)
within the model. The simulated increase in inequality generates a decline in the natural interest
rate by between 4 and 5 percentage points, in line with the decline of the natural rate estimated
by Laubach and Williams (2016). At the same time, the simulation also replicates the major part
of the increase in the bottom 90% debt-to-income ratio, roughly tracks the increase in the bottom
90% Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratio and replicates about two thirds of the peak increase of the value
of the housing stock relative to GDP. The simulation thus suggests that the decline in the natural
rate of interest and the pre-crisis upward trend in in household indebtedness and house prices are
to a significant extent both consequences of a more skewed income distribution. Put differently, the
increase in income inequality meant that the Fed had to accept a downward trend of the Federal
Funds rate and the associated rise in household debt and house prices if it wanted to continue to
meet its inflation target.
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The main implication of the above analysis for monetary policy is that the natural rate may
remain at its current low level for a long time, as the distribution of income tends to change only
slowly, and thus the scope for “conventional” monetary policy to stabilize the US economy may
remain limited. Furthermore, to the extent that the tax and transfer system may change the
distribution of income in an efficient manner, it implies a potentially important role for fiscal policy
in determining the distance of the economy from the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) and the overall level
of household debt in the economy.
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A For online publication only: Microsimulation used to com-
pute saver households MPS
I describe the microsimulation I use to calibrate the wealth curvature parameter for the case of the
simple model of Section 2, but the procedure in the full model is fully analogous. For the purpose
of the microsimulation, I exogenize the saver households non-interest net income, as well as the real
interest rate, implying that her behavior is described by
bS,t =
R
Π
bS,t−1 + YS,t − CS,t (42)
ΛS,t =
1
CσSS,t
(43)
ΛS,t = βSEt
{
ΛS,t+1
R
Π
}
) + φb (bS,t)
−σb (44)
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I then simulate an on impact permanent increase in YS,t occurring in t = 1. I compute the
marginal propensity to save over a horizon of 6 years (24 quarters) as
MPSS,1−24 =
bS,24 − b0∑24
t=1 dYS,t
(45)
The reason for the six year horizon is that the empirical estimates of the MPS Dynant et al.
(2004) uses data on saving rates which is six years apart (see Kumhof et al. (2015) for further
details on how to compute the MPS in a way consistent with the empirical estimates). Finally,
given the calibration of the other parameters as described in section 2.5, I use σb set MPSS,1−24
to the empirical target value.
Note that in the presence of housing and physical capital, the numerator of (45) features the
increase in the value of the holdings of these assets as well.
B For online publication only: A simple microfoundation of
the borrowing friction
The increasing relationship between the loan rate RL,t and the borrower LTV assumed in the main
text may be microfounded by assuming borrowing is subject to frictions similar to Onorante et al.
(2017). Specifically, I assume that that the household’s housing wealth is subject to idiosyncratic
uncertainty which resolves at the beginning of the period, and that a household j defaults if her
housing wealth is less than her real debt RLj,,tΠt bCC,j,t−1. More formally, default occurs if
ωj,tHCC,j,t−1QH,j,t <
RL,j,t
Πt
bCC,j,t−1
where ωj,t denotes an i.i.d. random variable with mean one. Hence the default threshold of
household j is given by
ωj,t =
RL,j,t
Πt
bCC,j,t−1
HCC,j,t−1QH,j,t
(46)
I assume that in case of a realization of ωj,t below the default threshold and thus default by the
household, the loss-given-default incurred by the financial intermediary is fixed at a fraction LGD
of the loan, with 0 ≤ LGD ≤ 1. Furthermore, in order to abstract from the effect of loan losses
on the financial intermediary, I follow Bernanke et al. (1999) and assume that the debt-contract
is contingent on the realization of aggregate variables to ensure that in every quarter, the financial
intermediary earns an average nominal rate of return Rt−1FIC, where FIC − 1 represents, non-
bankruptcy related costs of financial intermediation, which I assume to be a fixed fraction of the
total loan amount. Hence the interest rate adjusts accordingly ex post, and is given by
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RL,j,t =
Rt−1FIC
1− LGDJ (ωj,t) (47)
where J (ωt) denotes the cumulative distribution function of ωj,t. This equation replaces the ad
hoc loan supply relationship assumed in the main text (i.e. equation 24). Finally, defaulting
households face a cost LGDRL,j,tΠt bCC,j,t−1, implying that otherwise identical defaulting and non-
defaulting households face identical debt related payments at the beginning of period t.7 After
ωj,t has been revealed and some households default, resources are redistributed between borrower
households such that their housing wealth is again identical before they make their consumption and
saving decisions. With these assumptions, the borrowing household’s budget constraint is identical
regardless of default, an I therefore drop the j subscript from now on:
RL,t
Πt
bCC,t−1 + CCC,t +QH,t (HCC,t −HCC,t−1) = bCCt + wCC,tNCC,t − TCC,t (48)
The FOCs with respect to consumption CCC,t, real loans bCC,t, housing HCC,t, and the expected
loan interest rate RL,t+1 imply
ΛCC,t =
1
CσCCCC,t
(49)
ΛCC,t = βCCEt
ΛCC,t+1
RL,t+1
Πt+1
+
dRL,t+1
dbCC,t
(ω¯t+1, RL,t+1, bCC,t) bCC,t
Πt+1
 (50)
QH,t =
φH,t,CC
ΛCC,tH
σH,CC
CC,t
+βCCEt
ΛCC,t+1ΛCC,t
QH,t+1 − dRL,t+1dHCC,t (ω¯t+1, RL,t+1, HCC,t)
Πt+1
bCC,t
 (51)
where dRL,t+1dbCC,t (ω¯t+1, RL,t+1, bCC,t) and
dRL,t+1
dHCC,t
(ω¯t+1, RL,t+1, HCC,t) denote the implicit func-
tion derivatives of RL,t+1 with respect to bCC,tand HCC,t, respectively, given by
7Specifically, at the beginning of period t, a non defaulting households repays RL,,t
Πt
bCC,t−1, while a defaulting
household repays (1 − LGD)RL,,t
Πt
bCC,t−1 but faces default costs LGD
RL,,t
Πt
bCC,t−1, which sums up to the same
debt-related payment as the one of the non-defaulting households. This assumption is necessary to ensure that a
change in the lending rate caused by an increase in the expected probability of default EtJt+1 has an effect on
household behavior.
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dRL,t+1 (ω¯t+1, RL,t+1)
dbCC,t
=
LGDJ ′ (ω¯t+1)
ω¯t+1
bCC,t
RL,t+1
(1− LGDJ (ω¯t+1)− LGDJ ′ (ω¯t+1) ω¯t+1) (52)
dRL,t+1
dHCC,t
(ω¯t+1, RL,t+1, HCC,t) =
−LGDJ ′ (ω¯t+1) ω¯t+1HCC,tRL,t+1
((1− LGDJ (ω¯t+1))− LGDJ ′ (ω¯t+1) ω¯t+1) (53)
For dRL,t+1(ω¯t+1,RL,t+1)dbCC,t > 0 and
dRL,t+1
dHCC,t
(ω¯t+1, RL,t+1, HCC,t) < 0 it has to be true that 1LGD >
J (ω¯t+1)+J
′ (ω¯t+1) ω¯t+1. A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is that its right-hand-side
is less than one, which is met under the assumptions I adopt below. I assume a logistic form for
J (ωt)
J (ωt) =
1
1 + e
− ω¯t−1σh
(54)
Hence loan supply is now determined by the three parameters FIC, LGD and σh, while the
slope parameter χCC is no longer needed. I pin down FIC by adopting a target value for ratio
of non-bankruptcy-related-costs to net interest income (FIC−1)RL−R , which I estimate based on the
FDIC Quarterly banking profile. Specifically, I calculate (
Total noninterest expense
Total Assets )
( Net interest incomeTotal loans and leases )
≈ 59%. I set the
steady state default rate J (ω¯) equal to the average “Delinquency Rate on Single-Family Residential
Mortgages, Booked in Domestic Offices, All Commercial Banks”, which equals an annualized 4.2%.
Using the (implied) values of FIC, J (ω¯), the (unchanged) target value for RL − R and equation
(47) pins down the required LGD value. Tables 6 and 7 display the complete list of targets and
parameter values. Values which differ from the model with the ad hoc borrowing friction of the
main text are in bold.
Figure 6 compares the loan supply curve implied by the ad hoc borrowing friction to the micro-
founded loan supply curve (equation (47). The curves cross at an LTV of 0.31, which is the steady-
state value implied by the empirical targets. Over the relevant LTV range (i.e. LTV > 0.31), the
microfounded loan supply curve is steeper than the relationship based on the ad hoc borrowing
friction.
C For online publication only: Results with the microfounded
loan supply curve
With the microfounded, steeper loan supply curve, the positive effects of both wage inequality and
price mark-up shocks on non-rich household borrowing and their LTV are lower, while the increase
of the value of the housing stock and the decline of the natural interest rate are larger (compare
the red and the black lines in Figure 7). Adopting the microfounded loan borrowing friction has
thus qualitatively identical effects to assuming a steeper loan supply curve (a higher χCC ) in the
context of the ad hoc borrowing friction (see Figure 2), and the reasons are analogous, too (see the
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discussion in Section 4.1). These effects show up qualitatively as well when repeating the simulation
of the observed decline in the labor share and the bottom 90% income share (see Figures 8 to 10,
compare the red and black dashed and dotted lines). Quantitatively, the biggest effect of adopting
microfounded loan supply shows up in the response of the value of the housing stock, which increases
by about twice as much, thus outpacing the increase observed in the data, and the correspondingly
the LTV, whose increase approximately halves (See Figures 10 and 9), while the the trajectories of
the other variables change little.
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Table 7: Full model, parameter values
Parameter Parameter name Value NOCSP (θ = 1) Value CSP (θ = 0.97)
βS Rich utility discount factor 0.9951∗ 0.9652∗
βCC Borrower utility discount factor 0.9876∗ 0.9876∗
σS , σCC Utility curvature consumption 2* 2*
σS,H , σCC,H Utility curvature housing 2 2
NCC , NS Labor endowments 13
1
3
φH,S Rich utility weight on housing 0.03* 1.25∗
φH,CC Borrower utility weight on housing 0.47∗ 0.47∗
νcascade Consumption cascade 0 0/0.7
µp Price markup 1.26∗ 1.26∗
αK Output elasticity w.r.t. capital 0.21∗ 0.21∗
ωCC Borrower share in labor income 0.95∗ 0.95∗
δ Depreciation rate physical capital 0.025 0.025
I Capital adjustment cost curvature 7 7
FIC Non-default intermediation cost 0.0136* 0.0136*
σh Volatility housing value shock 0.0136* 0.0136*
LGD Loss Given Default 0.0136* 0.0136*
Targetbgov2GDP Government debt target 44% 44%
TargetG2GDP Government expenditure share target 20% 20%
σb CSP: Utility curvature, real financial assets − 0.5∗
σK CSP: Utility curvature, physical capital − 4∗
φb CSP: Utility weight on real financial assets 0∗ 3.13∗
φK CSP: Utility weight on physical capital 0∗ 72.68∗
Note: Values marked with a * are set to match the targets reported in Table 6.
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Figure 6: Loan supply curve
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Note: The linear black line displays the relationship between the spread of the mortgage rate over the risk free rate
(i.e.EtRL,t+1 −Rt ) and the loan-to-value ratio (LTVt = bCC,tHCC,tQH,t+1 ) implied by the borrowing friction assumed in the
main text (see equations (29) and (24)), with χCC as in Table 5. The non-linear red line displays the analogous relationship
implied by the microfounded borrowing friction derived in Appendix B (see equations 47, 46 54) and the calibration discussed
in Appendix C.
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Figure 7: Impact of a permanent increase in inequality
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Note: All results in the Figure are computed assuming CSP. The black lines refer to results computed using the model
of Section 3. The red lines (“Loan supply MF”) refer to a modified version of the model where the borrowing friction is
microfounded as described in Section B, implying that equations (47), (46) (54) replace equations (29) and (24). “Wage
inequality” indicates a one-off permanent decline in the elasticity of output with respect to the labor supplied by non-rich
(rich) households (i.e.dCC,t permanently declines, see equation (32)). “Profit rise” indicates a one-off increase in the price
markup (i.e. dµ,t permanently increases). “cascades” indiciates that the model allows for an effect of rich household total
consumption on non-rich housing demand (i.e. νcascade > 0, see equation (30)). The safe interest rate Rt and the risk
spread EtRL,t+1 − Rt are expressed as Annualized Percentage Rates (APR). The borrower debt-to-income ratio is based
on annualized borrower income. The borrower-debt-to-GDP ratio is based on annualized GDP.
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Figure 8: Simulation 1981-2016 - Income distribution and natural interest rate
Note: The label “Model: Loan supply microfounded” refers to a modified version of the model where the borrowing friction
is microfounded as described in Section B, implying that equations (47), (46) (54) replace equations (29) and (24). For
details on the meaning of the other labels, see the note below Figure 3.
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Figure 9: Simulation 1981-2016 - Borrower debt-to-income ratio and LTV
Note: See the note below Figure 8 for details on the labels reading “Model...”. See the note below Figure 4 for details on
the data sources.
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Figure 10: Simulation 1981-2016 - Nominal housing stock and total mortgage debt-to-
GDP ratios
Note: See the note below Figure 8 for details on the labels reading “Model...”. See the note below Figure 5 for details on
the data sources.
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